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Introduction
　Historians say that ‘the European conflict’, started in August 1914, transformed into 
‘the World War’, because of the huge interests that European powers had all over 
the world, especially in Asia. It is actually true, because all the participants – Great 
Britain and France, Russia and Germany – had wide commercial and political interests 
in the East. However, it should be noted that for Russia relations with the East had a 
special meaning. For the ‘Eurasian’ Russia her Far Eastern possessions were organic 
extension of the mainland, which guaranteed her connections with the rest of the 
world, and therefore they must be defended. During the First World War ‘the Great 
Siberian Railway’ became the main communication channel, which connected Russia 
with international market. All Russia’s relations with Europe were broken off as a result 
of the war, and the former enemy, Japan, became – by the irony of fate – the Russia’s 
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nearest influential neighbour. That is why the relations between Russia and Japan 
during the First World War had to transform into very intensive and even cooperative 
ones. 
　The interesting and unique phenomenon of Russo-Japanese rapprochement during the 
First World War has been studied intensively by different scholars of Japan, Russia and 
the USA since the middle of the twentieth century.1 However, despite the plain fact that 
the bilateral relations of that time were described even by contemporaries as “the Arms 
Alliance”,2 until now the aspect of military cooperation in Russo-Japanese relations seems 
to have been neglected. Certainly, the problem of Russian military orders during the 
First World War was investigated partly in Russian historiography, mainly by former 
officers of the Chief Ordnance Administration (Glavnoe Artilleriiskoe Upravlenie – 
GAU), but the Japanese orders were not analyzed as a special theme.3 Japanese military 
historians also investigated the problem of Japan’s armaments supply to Russia during 
the War, but they used only Japanese historical sources.4 As a consequence, the details 
１　Matsumoto Tadao, Kinsei Nihon gaikō-shi kenkyū (Studies on Diplomatic History of 
Contemporary Japan) (Tokyo, 1942), pp. 155-189; Peter A. Berton, The Secret Russo-
Japanese Alliance of 1916 (Ph.D. Dissertation, Columbia University, 1956); S. S. Grigortsevich, 
Dalnevostochnaia politika imperialisticheskikh derzhav v 1906–1917 gg. (Tomsk, 1965); Yoshimura 
Michio, Nihon to Roshia: Nichiro sengo kara Roshia kakumei made (Japan and Russia: From the 
Russo-Japanese War until the Russian Revolution) (Tokyo, 1968); E. B. Baryshev, Nichiro dōmei 
no jidai, 1914-1917: ‘Reigaitekina yūkō’ no shinsō (The Epoch of Russo-Japanese Alliance, 1914–
1917: The Truth About an ‘Exceptional Friendship’) (Fukuoka, 2007); Yu. S. Pestushko, Rossiisko-
yaponskie otnosheniya v gody Pervoi mirovoi voiny (1914-1917 gg.) (Khabarovsk, 2008). 
２　Ōba Kakō, “Nichiro shin-kyōyaku to heiki dōmei [New Japanese-Russian Convention and the 
Arms Alliance],” Taiyō, Vol. XXII, No. 10 (August 1, 1916), pp. 106-110. 
３　A. A. Manikovskii, Boevoe snabzhenie russkoi armii v voinu 1914-1918 gg., Ch. 1-2 (Moskva, 
1920-1922); General V. S. Mikhailov (1875–1929): Dokumenty k biografii. Ocherki po istorii 
voennoi promyshlennosti (Moskva, 2007); A. P. Zalyubovskii, Snabzhenie Russkoi Armii v 
Velikuyu voinu vintovkami, pulemyotami, revol’verami i patronami k nim (Belgrad, 1936); A. A. 
Manikovskii, Boevoe snabzhenie russkoi armii v mirovuyu voinu (Moskva, 1937); E. Z. Barsukov, 
Russkaia artilleriia v mirovuiu voinu, 2 vols (Moskva, 1938-1940); V. G. Fyodorov, Oruzheinoe delo 
na grani dvukh epoch (Raboty oruzheinika, 1900–1935), Ch. 2 (Moskva, 1939); E. Z. Barsukov, 
Artilleriia russkoi armii (1900–1917), 4 vols (Moskva, 1948-1949).
４　Akutagawa Tetsushi, “Buki yushutsu no keifu [The development of arms export],” part 1-2, 
Gunji shigaku (The Journal of Military History), March 1987– March 1988, Vol. 22 (No. 4), Vol. 
23 (No. 1), Vol. 23 (No. 4); Saitō Seiji, “Nihon kaigun ni yoru roshia kinkai no yusō, 1916-1917 nen 
[The Transportation of the Russia’s Specie Gold by Japanese Navy, 1916-1917],” Kokusai seiji 
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about that cooperation have been unclear until now in the historiography of Russo-
Japanese relations. The achievements of Soviet (Russian) historiography seem not to be 
known enough by Japanese history specialists, and vise versa.5 
　In this article the author attempts to overcome the limits of previous studies relating 
to the issue of Russo-Japanese military cooperation during the First World War by 
means of summarising and supplementing them with new sources and materials. More 
concretely, the author, focusing on the initiatives of the Russian Government concerning 
military purchasing in Japan and the evolution of a position of Japan’s ruling class during 
the Great War, strives to clarify the motives, the course and the meaning of Russo-
Japanese cooperation in the military sphere. Valuable materials of the Russian and 
Japanese archives help to reconstruct unknown episodes of Russo-Japanese relations of 
the past. 
The Beginning of the Russo-Japanese Military Cooperation: ‘Unexpected 
Ally’ (August 1914 – November 1914)
　The first days of the European war in the Russian Far East were covered with a 
menacing atmosphere of the potential Japanese invasion, however after several days the 
Russian War Ministry learned from different diplomatic, military and private channels 
that Japan’s leading trade companies had been ready to provide the Russian army with 
(International relations), No. 97, May 1991, pp. 154-177; Sakamoto Masako, Zaibatsu to teikokushugi: 
Mitsui bussan to chūgoku (Financial oligarchy and Imperialism: The Mitsui Bussan and China) 
(Tokyo, 2003). 
５　For the recent studies in this field see the following papers: E. A. Baryshev, “The Background 
of the Russo-Japanese Military Cooperation during the First World War: Mitsui Bussan’s Trading 
Strategy towards Russia,” Shimane Journal of North East Asian Research, No. 21, March 2011, 
pp. 23-41 (in Japanese); E. A. Baryshev, “The General Hermonius Mission to Japan (August 1914 – 
March 1915) and the Issue of Armaments Supply in Russo-Japanese Relations during the First 
World War,” Acta Slavica Iaponica, Vol. 30 (August, 2011), pp. 21-42; E. A. Baryshev, “Iaponskie 
vintovki na russkom fronte vo vremya Pervoi mirovoi voiny (1914–1917): Maloizvestnye stranitsy 
dvustoronnego sotrudnichestva,” Iaponiya 2011: Ezhegodnik (Moscow, 2011), pp. 238-254; E. A. 
Baryshev, “The Russo-Japanese “Arms Alliance” and the Bilateral Commercial Relations during 
the First World War: The Case of Bryner, Kuznetsov & Co., “Shimane Journal of North East 
Asian Research, No. 23, March 2012, pp. 193-215 (in Japanese); D. B. Pavlov,” Yaponiya i Rossiya v 
1914-1918: Sotrudnichestvo na fone “bol’shoi” politiki,” Voprosy istorii (Moscow, 2012), No. 11, pp. 
3-27.
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necessary arms, munitions and different military equipment. The first Japanese company 
to propose cooperative measures was the Mitsui Bussan Company, which had agents 
in both Petersburg and Vladivostok. The executives of Mitsui Bussan, who informed 
the Russian government about their wish to supply the Russian army with arms and 
munitions even before the decision of the Japanese government to begin war with 
Germany, understood clearly that their economic positions would be shaken greatly 
by this ‘European conflict’ and looked for ways of saving their prosperity. Russian gold 
at London banks was one of the desirable prizes for the company. Importantly, Mitsui 
Bussan acted as the central member of the government-controlled syndicate Taihei 
Kumiai (or Taiping Company) that had been exporting old-pattern weapons, produced 
at Japanese arsenals, to the developing countries. Other members of the Taihei Kumiai 
were the Okura Company and the Takata Company, whose representatives also 
immediately departed from Tokyo to Russia at the beginning of August, bringing with 
them special recommendation letters of the Russian Embassy. The interests of Taihei 
Kumiai’s members were keenly connected with those of the ‘military party’ of Japan, 
formed with the Elder Statesmen (genro) and the General Staff as its core elements.6 
　On August 15, Japan’s Government sent to Berlin its ultimatum and initiated 
preparation for war with Germany. The next day, the Deputy-Chief of the General Staff 
of Japan, Lieutenant-General Akashi Motojiro (1864–1919) met with Russian military 
agent Major-General V. K. Samoilov (1866–1916) and informed him that Japan was going 
to help Russia with arms supply, and Russia should not worry about the security of 
its Asiatic possessions.7 In this situation, when Russia and Japan were going to stand 
together at war against Germany and its allies, the emperor Nikolai II encouraged the 
initiative of GAU and issued the order, according to which a special technical commission 
was to be dispatched to Japan and America, for the purchase of commodities and 
materials which the Russian army needed.8
　On August 25, the Russian military commission, consisting of the armaments 
specialists of the Artillery Committee of GAU, and headed by Major-General E. K. 
Hermonius (1864–1938), departed from Saint-Petersburg to the Far East. The officers – 
Colonels V. G. Fyodorov (1874–1966) and M. P. Podtyagin – brought with them samples 
６　For details see: E. A. Baryshev, “The Background of the Russo-Japanese Military Cooperation 
during the First World War,” pp. 24-27 (In Japanese).
７　Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi voenno-istoricheskii arkhiv (RGVIA), f. 2000 (Glavnoe Upravlenie 
General’nogo Shtaba), op. 1, d. 4453, l. 159. 
８　RGVIA, f. 2000, op. 1, d. 4060, l. 15, 15 ob.; Fyodorov, Oruzheinoe delo, pp. 13, 24. 
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of different arms and munitions, and, more importantly, General Hermonius was vested 
with the authority “to carry on all negotiations with the trade company Mitsui”.9 The 
tasks of the Russian commission, set before General Hermonius and his colleagues by 
GAU, were “to purchase immediately from Japanese government about one million 
rifles, the same as are used in the Japanese army, with cartridges in a quantity of one 
thousand per rifle,” “to find out the possibility of urgent production of powder by Japan 
for the field guns [400,000], our shrapnel shells [800,000] and time-fuses [800,000],” and 
to order some quantity of trotyl, toluene and picric acid.10 The members of the Russian 
technical commission supposed that the Japanese government would sell to the Russian 
War Ministry arms and munitions from their mobilisation stocks, but soon it became 
clear that the Japanese government was not so earnest in its military cooperation. 
At the end of August, the War Ministry of Japan notified the Russian government 
that it could not sell to Russia any weapons from their stocks. All that the Japanese 
government was going to transfer to Russia were – almost useless – sixteen old 
model cannons that the Japanese army had taken as trophies after the fall of the Port-
Arthur fortress.11 The only arms that Mitsui Bussan offered to the Russian artillerists 
immediately after their arrival to Tokyo were 20,350 rifles and 15,050 carbines for 7-mm 
calibre cartridge, produced by the Tokyo Arsenal for the Mexican government. 
　The breakthrough at the Russo-Japanese negotiations at Tokyo occurred at the 
beginning of October, when General Hermonius was informed that the Japanese 
government had eventually agreed to sell to Russia 200,000 rifles of an 1897 model 
with 100 cartridges per rifle. By October 10 Hermonius received permission to sign 
９　RGVIA, f. 2000, op. 1, d. 4060, ll. 15, 15 ob.; Nihon Gaiko Bunsho (Japanese Diplomatic Documents, 
further – NGB), 1914, Vol. 3, p. 680; Nihon Gaikō Shiryōkan (Japan Diplomatic Records Archive, 
further – NGS), file 5.1.5.17-7, Honpō ni oite kakkoku heiki juhin sonota chōtatsu kankei zakken: 
Rokoku-no bu (The Materials Relating to the Purchasing of the Weapons and Other Products 
in Japan by Different States: Russia), Vol. 1, pp. 1-2; Fyodorov, Oruzheinoe delo, pp. 12-13; V. G. 
Fyodorov, V poiskakh oruzhiya (Moskva, 1964), pp. 24, 31. 
10　RGVIA, f. 2000, op. 1, d. 4060, ll. 24-25. 
11　No. 200, Malevsky-Malevich to Sazonov, August 21, 1914, Arkhiv vneshnei politiki Rossiiskoi 
Federatsii (AVPRI), f. 133 (Kantselyariya ministra), op. 470, d. 70; Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia v 
epokhu imperializma (further - MOEI), Serie 3, Vol. 6, Ch. 1 (Moskva, 1935), pp. 244-245, footnotes; 
RGVIA, f. 2000, op. 1, d. 4059, l. 2; NGB, 1914, Vol. 3, p. 689; Bōei kenkyūsho [The National Institute 
for Defense Studies, NIDS], file T3-6.39, Ji Taishō 3-nen itaru dō-11-nen. Kakkoku-gun ni gunki 
kyōkyū ni kansuru tuzuri (The File Relating Weapons Supply for Armies of Different Countries, 
1914–1922), pp. 403-406.
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contracts in Tokyo, and in two or three days he concluded his first contract, concerning 
the ‘Mexican guns’, with a Mitsui Bussan agent. On October 21, General Hermonius 
concluded with Taihei Kumiai representative contract No. 3027 about purchasing 
200,000 rifles and 25 millions cartridges, and contract No. 3026 for 500,000 3-inch shells. 
Those first bargains with the Japanese syndicate about rifles and ‘the work-horse’ of the 
Russian army (3-inch shells) were undoubtedly a big success. 
　As a matter of fact, the Japanese War Ministry formally had no right to sell weapons, 
both new and old, used in the army. Weapons, sold by the Ministry through Taihei 
Kumiai, were arms newly produced at the state arsenals in Tokyo and Osaka. In order 
to cope with this limitation, the Ministry found an interesting loophole and used its 
inter-ministerial resources. At first, it gathered old-model rifles and transferred them 
to arsenals on the pretext of repair. At the same time, the arsenals obtained an order 
to produce the same quantity of rifles (200,000) for the Japanese army. Along with the 
production of new guns, the arsenals transferred ‘repaired’ old rifles, formally as newly 
produced ones, through Taihei Kumiai to Russia. The arsenals acquired old guns as 
for repair, but returned to the Army new guns of 1905 model. In other words, the sale 
of old-model rifles was very beneficial for Japan, because it helped “to accelerate the 
process of change of 1897 model rifles with ones of 1905 model, planned for one or two 
years.”12 
　General Hermonius managed to use especially warm relations between Japanese 
financial circles and America’s industrialists, and, on October 24, signed another contract 
with Mitsui Bussan about purchasing 3,003,000 pounds of powder (approximately equal 
to 1,362 metric tons) from the DuPont Company, the leading player on the world powder 
market.13 In this sense, the Hermonius Commission’s activity paved a way to the arms 
purchasing on the American continent. At the end of October, Hermonius concluded a 
new contract with the Taihei Kumiai syndicate about seventy-six heavy artillery guns.14 
12　Taketomi Tokitoshi, Ōkuma naikaku zaisei kaisōroku (Recollections about the Financial Policy 
of the Okuma Cabinet) in Shibutani Sakusuke, Taketomi Tokitoshi (Tokyo, 1934), pp. 26-33; NIDS, 
file T.3-6.39, pp. 282-283, 546-550.
13　RGVIA, f. 2000, op. 1, d. 4453, ll. 149, 83; RGVIA, f. 2000, op. 1, d. 4060, l. 7; Gosudarstvennyi 
Arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii (GARF), f. R-6173 (E. K. Hermonius), op. 1, d. 11, ll. 31, 31 ob; GARF, f. 
R-6173, op. 1, d. 26, p. 38; General V. S. Mikhailov (1875–1929), pp. 361-362. 
14　GARF, f. R-6173, op. 1, d. 11, ll. 23, 23 ob.; GARF, f. 676 (Velikii Knyaz Georgii Mikhailovich), op. 1, 
d. 362, l. 13; Akutagawa, “Buki yushutsu no keifu (2) (The Development of Arms Export, part. 2),” 
Gunji Shigaku (The Journal of Military History) Vol. 23, No. 1 (June 1987), pp. 49-50.
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These old guns, taken from different fortresses, seemed to have been sold to Russia 
by the Japanese War Ministry in the same way as the earlier rifles. That is, to replace 
them, the Osaka Arsenal, using the Russian money, had to produce new analogical guns, 
and that opened a way to the speedy modernization of Japanese army. 
　At the same time, the Chief Quartermaster’s Administration (Glavnoe Intendantskoe 
Upravlenie – GIU) of the War Ministry carried on negotiations – both at Vladivostok 
and Petrograd – concerning purchasing from Japan different kinds of soldier equipment. 
It was GIU that was also charged with the purchasing of foodstuff for the needs of 
the Chief Department of Land Management and Agriculture (Glavnoe Upravlenie 
Zemleustroistva i Zemledeliya – GUZiZ). On October 8, the Vladivostok fortress’s 
Quartermaster, Colonel V. F. Filonov (1868–?) concluded his first contract, No. 14779, 
with the Mitsui Company about 250,000 arshins (arshin is a Russian unit of length, equal 
to 71.12 centimeters or 28 inches) of protective coloured cloth that had to be delivered 
by the end of the year. In October and November, Filonov ordered from Japanese trade 
companies, such as Mitsui Bussan and Nakatani Shobei, 1,928,000 arshins of cloth (4.252 
million roubles) and 500,000 sets of soldier equipment from Mitsui (3.755 million roubles).15 
Interestingly, the Okura Company, which had a special respect from the Russian War 
Ministry, had almost monopolised the Petrograd’s orders of GIU. On October 12, trade 
representatives of Okura signed first contracts with the Quartermaster’s Administration 
of the Petrograd Military District concerning 300,000 “leather belts with two cartridge-
bags”, 10,000 saddles, and 930,000 arshins of protective coloured cloth. By the end of 
the year, the total sum of Okura’s contracts, concluded at Petrograd, had exceeded 6 
million yen. The inspection of the production, ordered by GIU, was realised by Russian 
quartermaster officers, headed by Captain F. A. Popovsky (1879–?), who were dispatched 
to Japan at the end of November, 1914.16
　The autumn of 1914 was the starting point both of active purchasing efforts of the 
Russian Government in Japan and the active Russo-Japanese cooperation during the 
First World War. One of the symbols of that cooperation was intensified contacts 
15　Mitsui Archives (Tokyo), Rokoku seifu keiyaku (Contracts with the Russian government), 
Bussan-2353-15, I.15.1-4 (microfilm No. 355); RGVIA, f. 499 (GIU), op. 5, d. 395, ll. 126-128, 154-
155; RGVIA, f. 499, op. 5, d. 396, ll. 26-33, 47, 54-57 ob., 189-191 ob.; Nakatani Shōbei tsuitō-roku (In 
Mourning for Nakatani Shobei) (Tokyo, 1941), pp. 19-23, 114-117, appendix p. 5.
16　RGVIA, f. 499, op. 5, d. 395, ll. 60, 66-69, 98-99, 105-106, 147-149, 214, 223; Ōkura Zaibatsu 
Shiryōsitsu [further – Okura Archives] (The Tokyo Keizai University), file 23.2-87, Nihon ginkō he 
teishutsu suru keiyakusho (The Contracts, submitted to the Bank of Japan).
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between War Ministries of two countries. After Japan’s declaration of war against 
Germany, the Russian Army had accepted seven Japanese military observers, and in 
October General-Major Oba Jiro (1864–1935) was welcomed at the Russian Headquarters 
as a Japan’s representative. Moreover, in the middle of October, the special Japanese 
Red Cross mission was dispatched to Russia. The mission arrived to Petrograd in the 
middle of November, and worked in the Russian capital until April 1916 at the Japanese 
Red Cross hospital. Then, in the middle of November, at the Changchun railway station 
(Kuanchengzi), the southern end of the Chinese Eastern Railway (CER), Japan handed 
over to the Russians as “the sign of bilateral friendship” sixteen old cannons, the trophies 
of the Russo-Japanese war. The atmosphere of the ‘Russo-Japanese friendship’ and even 
‘Alliance’, influenced by the active participation of Japan in the ‘European war’, had 
spread widely by the beginning of November 1914, when the ‘stronghold of the German 
militarism’ in the Far East, Tsingtao fortress, fell.17 However, with the fall of Tsingtao 
Japan’s active participation in the war had come to the end, and the Russo-Japanese 
relations entered a new phase. 
The Arms Question and the Big Politics (December 1914 – May 1915)
　In the middle of November, GAU decided to withdraw Colonel Fyodorov from Tokyo, 
but Hermonius and Podtyagin were ordered to stay in Japan for some months in order 
to purchase some quantity of rifles and heavy artillery. Interestingly, Hermonius was 
advised to buy some munitions such as time-fuses and shell-cases to soften the position 
of the Japanese Government in the arms supply question. In Hermonius’s terminology 
these were ‘gifts’ to the Japanese that the Russian government was to buy. At this 
time, Russian military authorities even hoped that after the completion of the Tsingtao 
operation the Japanese government would agree to dispatch its siege-artillery regiments 
with its manpower to the Russian front. Eventually, by the end of 1914, Japan had 
agreed to sell to Russia fifty-nine heavy artillery guns and to dispatch with them 11 
17　See: Hara Teruyuki, Shiberia shuppei: Kakumei to kanshō, 1917-1922 (The Siberian Expedition: 
Revolution and Intervention, 1917–1922) (Tokyo, 1989), pp. 78-79; Kawai Toshinobu, “Daiichiji 
sekai taisenchū no Nihon sekijūjisha ni yoru Ei-Futsu-Ro he no kyūgohan haken [The Dispatch of 
the Japanese Red Cross missions to the Great Britain, France and Russia during the First World 
War],” Gunji Shigaku (The Journal of Military History) Vol. 43, No. 2 (September 2007), pp. 4-25; 
NIDS, file T.3-6.39, pp. 299-427; RGVIA, f. 2000, op.1, d. 4058; Baryshev, Nichiro dōmei no jidai, pp. 
46-48, 59-62, 75-79, 81-82. 
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officers and some unter-officers as instructors. Obviously, the dispatch of Japanese 
instructors to the Russian front was a clear “political measure”, taken by Japan in order 
to exaggerate its contribution to the Allies in their struggle with Germany.18
　The position of the Japanese Government to the question of bilateral military 
cooperation was ambivalent. On the one hand, the further rapprochement with Russia 
as one of the Entente’s countries and as Japan’s neighbour in Manchuria had been 
one of the strategic goals of Japanese ruling class, which strived to use the European 
war for the strengthening of Japan’s influence in the Far Eastern affairs. On the other 
hand, the War Ministry of Japan had no intention to enhance the army of the ‘potential 
enemy’ at their own expense. In the end of 1914, the Russian representatives in Tokyo 
requested the Japanese government to hand over to Russia 150,000 rifles, and after some 
days were additionally instructed to initiate a request for 300,000 rifles.19 The Russian 
Government even proposed to Japan to pay for all costs required for the production 
of the same quantity of new-pattern rifles for the Japanese Army, if Japan agree to 
supply Russia with rifles from its mobilization stocks, but, despite of this, the Japanese 
Government had agreed eventually to sell only 100,000 rifles – of “rather doubtful 
quality”, in Hermonius’s words – after their repair. In accordance with contract No. 41 
from January 28, the syndicate Taihei Kumiai promised to transfer to Russia 85,000 
rifles and 15,000 carbines of the 1897 model with 22.6 million cartridges.20 
　The Russian representatives in Tokyo continuously made different attempts to 
procure more rifles. General Samoilov considered that “purchasing from the Japanese 
War Ministry, without any intermediation of private persons, of the boots, cloth and 
other materials, offered to Russia and described by the Russian quartermasters as ‘of 
good quality and reasonable price’, might contribute significantly to a more successful 
course of negotiations for the purchasing of rifles.”21 GIU immediately recognised this 
consideration as reasonable, and in some days prepared the list of the military goods to 
be purchased in Japan. Samoilov was instructed to buy 800,000 pairs of soldier boots, 
grey overcoat cloth in large quantities, 1,240,000 yards of protective coloured cloth, 
18　Baryshev, “The General Hermonius Mission to Japan,” pp. 34-36. For the dispatch of Japanese 
artillerists to Russia see: NGS, file 5.1.5.17-7, Vol. 1, pp. 378-464.
19　AVPRI, f. 150 (Iaponskii stol), op. 493, d. 1868, ll. 97-106; AVPRI, f. 150, op. 493, d. 1869, ll. 3-5; 
NGB, 1915, Ch. 3, vol. 2, p. 992.
20　AVPRI, f. 150, op. 493, d. 1869, l. 17 ob.; GARF, R-6173, op. 1, d. 11, ll. 4, 74; AVPRI, f. 133, op. 470, 
d. 82. L. 9. 
21　AVPRI, f. 150, op. 493, d. 1869, l. 7.
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and 130,000 yards of waterproof canvas. The negotiations between Samoilov and the 
representatives of the War Ministry of Japan began from about January 21 and finished 
at the beginning of February with the signing of large-scale contracts.22 
　It should be noted that at the end of January, the Russian War Ministry had managed 
to contract one million 3-line rifles from the American Remington Arms Company, 
which was undoubtedly considered a splendid breakthrough. Probably, in this situation, 
the GAU officials thought that the opportunities in the Japanese arms market had been 
already exhausted and had decided to withdraw Hermonius from Tokyo.23 By the time 
of withdrawal, General Hermonius ordered from Japanese firms 340,000 small arms of 
different calibres, 347 artillery guns (including 216 Arisaka field guns of 1898 model), 
time-fuses and cartridge-cases for 3-inch shells (500,000), shrapnel shells (500,000), powder 
of different kinds and other strategic materials. That was the imposing result of the 
Commission’s activity. The total sum of orders, made by General Hermonius, amounted 
to 38 million yen. About 70% of all orders were given through the syndicate Taihei 
Kumiai, 23% through Mitsui Bussan and the rest of them were contracted with other 
trade companies of Japan. As for the profits, Taihei Kumiai and Mitsui Bussan re-sold 
their arms to Russia with 15-20% or even higher extra-charge, and, by the beginning 
of the 1915, had almost overcome the financial crisis, getting large sums of Russian 
gold in London banks.24 On March 1, Hermonius made their way home from the newly 
constructed Tokyo railway station, where they were given a hearty send-off by those 
who had already obtained great profits from Russia’s war orders.25 
　Importantly, the Hermonius Commission did not limit the purchasing activity of GAU 
in Japan. Some strategic materials, such as non-ferrous metals (zinc, lead, antimony, 
etc.), or camphor and sulphur, are supposed to have been ordered through the Ordnance 
Head of the Vladivostok fortress, Mayor-General V. P. Sagatovsky (1857–?), but these 
data are known insufficiently. General Samoilov also played an important role in the 
22　NGB, 1915, Ch. 3, vol. 2, pp. 995-996; AVPRI, f. 133, op. 470, d. 82, l. 16; RGVIA, f. 2000, op. 1, d. 
4454, ll. 14-14 ob., 20.
23　General V. S. Mikhailov (1875–1929), p. 345; Dale C. Rielage, Russian Supply Efforts in America 
During the First World War (London, 2002), p. 30. See also: MOEI, vol. 7, Ch. 2 (Moscow, 1935), pp. 
208-210.
24　MOEI, Vol. 7, Ch. 1, pp. 156-158; GARF, R-6173, op. 1, d. 11; Baryshev, “The Background of the 
Russo-Japanese Military Cooperation during the First World War,” pp. 28-29; Baryshev, “The 
General Hermonius Mission to Japan,” pp. 31-33, 36-39.
25　Hōchi shimbun, March 1, 1915, No.13645, p. 4; Hōchi shimbun, March 2, 1915, No.13646, p. 4. 
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placement and control of these orders, especially after Hermonius’s return to Russia.26 
Since March 1915, GAU’s interests in Japan were represented by Colonel Podtyagin, 
who was responsible for inspection and purchasing of time-fuses, gun shells, other 
military ammunitions. In April and May, thanks to the continuous efforts of the Russian 
servicemen and diplomats, the Japanese government, through syndicate Taihei Kumiai, 
handed over to Russia different arms and munitions on the total sum of over 8 million 
yen.27 As for GIU’s contracts, their total sum had reached approximately to 40 million 
yen by June 1915. The first group of the contracts were those which were concluded 
with such Japanese trade companies as Mitsui, Okura and Nakatani during the first 
months of the war. These orders concerning cloth, soldier boots, saddles and other 
soldier equipment cost approximately 20 million yen. The second group of contracts 
were those concluded by General Samoilov between January and June of 1915 with 
Japan’s War Ministry and private companies.28 Additionally, since the spring 1915, 
General Samoilov ordered from Japan some soldier equipment as infantry spades and 
axes for the Chief Military-Technical Administration (Glavnoe Voenno-Tekhnicheskoe 
Upravlenie – GVTU) and individual antiseptic bandages for the Chief Military-Sanitary 
Administration (Glavnoe Voenno-Sanitarnoe Upravlenie – GVSU).29 
　The Russian Naval Ministry was also involved in purchasing activity in Japan from 
the beginning of 1915. First of all, its Chief Shipbuilding Department (Glavnoe Upravlenie 
Korablestroeniya) managed to conclude several contracts with Okura at Petrograd 
concerning wire rope. Then, from March 1915, the Naval Ministry began purchasing 
directly in Tokyo through the naval agent A. N. Voskresensky (1879–1930) and procured 
from the Japanese Naval Ministry eighteen torpedoes, four million of rifle cartridges, 
sixteen 4.7-inch Armstrong quick-firing guns with shells and accessories. Supposedly, 
when it became clear that the War Ministry of Japan was not willing to concede more 
arms, the Russian government strived to purchase some weapons and strategic goods 
from the Navy of Japan, bypassing the resistance of the War Ministry. At the same time, 
26　RGVIA, f. 2000, op. 1, d. 4454, ll. 74, 116, 118, 120, 125, 134-135, 151a, 182, 202, 235.
27　NGB, 1915, Ch. 3, vol. 2, pp. 1032-1033.
28　NGB, 1915, Ch. 3, vol. 2, pp. 1005-1009; RGVIA, f. 499, op. 5, d. 395, ll. 151, 211, 211 ob., 252, 263; F. 
2000, op. 1, d. 4453, l. 15; F. 2000, op. 1, d. 4454, l. 12; F. 499, op. 5, d. 396, ll. 26-33, 47, 54-57 ob., 174, 
189-191 ob.; F. 499, op. 5, d. 429, ll. 77-78, 106, 128-129.
29　NGB, 1915, Ch. 3, vol. 2, pp. 993-994, 996-997, 1032; AVPRI, f. 133, op. 470, d. 82, l. 30; Okura 
Archives, file 23.2-88, Robun keiyakusho (The Contracts in Russian); RGVIA, f. 2000, op. 1, d. 4454, 
ll. 46, 61, 63, 68, 85, 93, 123, 136, 140, 153, 204, 231. 
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the Russian Naval Ministry also managed to purchase Arisaka field guns with shells and 
pyroxylin (nitrocellulose) directly from Taihei Kumiai.30
　The Elder Statesmen, headed by Marshall Yamagata Aritomo (1838–1922), tried to 
use the mechanism of ‘the Court Diplomacy’ in order to promote their ‘pro-Russian’ 
diplomatic course. Yamagata, as the nearest advisor to the Mikado, could resolve Russia’s 
rifle question using the special decree of the Japanese Emperor, if the Russian monarch 
asked Mikado about rifles officially. Certainly, this measure was not merely an attempt 
to help Russia, but should serve as a prologue to the future Russo-Japanese talks, which 
would guarantee Japan with the Russia’s support in the Far Eastern affairs. However, at 
that time, Russian diplomats decided that it was dangerous for Russia’s prestige to apply 
for the Emperor’s help and refused this plan.31 
　Interestingly, Japanese statesmen looked for the Russo-Japanese rapprochement in 
the midst of the Sino-Japanese negotiations that began after the presentation of the so-
called ‘21 demands’ on January 18. Certainly, the Japanese Government needed Russia’s 
support during the Sino-Japanese negotiations, and that is why it could not decline 
Russia’s requests in the arms supply question completely. However, it tried to use 
Russia’s need for rifles as an instrument to achieve its strategic aims in Chinese affairs. 
Metaphorically speaking, the arms question was an important trump card in the political 
grand-game that the Japanese government played. On March 8, Ambassador N. A. 
Malevsky (1855–?) wired to Foreign Minister S. D. Sazonov (1860–1927) that “the rifles’ 
provision is delayed because of not only technical considerations, but also because of 
political reasons in connection with the current negotiations at Peking and the upcoming 
Parliament elections in two weeks.”32 
　Actually, the position of Japanese government had softened with the end of Sino-
Japanese talks. On May 10, the Japanese military representative at the Russian 
Headquarters, Major-General Nakajima Masatake (1870–1931), who arrived in Russia 
30　Okura Archives, file 23.2-88, Robun keiyakusho (The Contracts in Russian); NIDS, file Т.3-106.563, 
Taishō sen’eki senji shorui (The Documents Relating the War Conflicts of Taisho Epoch), Vol. 
109, Part 4: Heiki jōto 4-dome. Rokoku seifu ni taisuru bun (Armaments transfers. The Russian 
Government), pp. 28-34, 39-81.
31　About “the Court Diplomacy” of Marshal Yamagata see: E. A. Baryshev, “Rol’ kniazia 
Yamagata v podgotovke russko-iaponskogo soiuza 1916 goda: Za kulisami iaponskogo vizita 
velikogo kniazia Georgiia Mikhailovicha,” Iaponiya 2007: Ezhegodnik (Moscow, 2007), pp. 249-265; 
Baryshev, “Iaponskaia missiia velikogo kniazia Georgiia Mikhailovicha,” pp. 58-72. 
32　AVPRI, f. 150, op. 493, d. 1869, l. 64.
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instead of Major-General Oba, notified the Head of the Supreme Commander’s Staff, N. N. 
Yanushkevich (1868–1918), that “Japan now is completely ready to help Russia with all 
its resources.” It was a token of Japan’s gratitude to Russia that tacitly supported Japan 
during Sino-Japanese negotiations. On May 14, Nakajima arrived from the Headquarters 
to Petrograd in order to transmit “a private request” of the Supreme Commander, 
Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich (1856–1929), concerning the cession of arms, which the 
Russian army needed. Having this request, Yamagata and his circle could apply ‘the 
Court Diplomacy’ mechanism to the bilateral Russo-Japanese relations. The connections 
between two Imperial Courts were outside of the competition of Japanese Government, 
and Yamagata could ignore the resistance of Government members in the question of 
arms supply. On May 20, the council of five field-marshals and the war minister took 
place in Imperial Palace at Tokyo, where it was decided to supply Russia with 100,000 
Arisaka rifles of 1905 model with 20 million cartridges. This decision was immediately 
approved by the Emperor and transmitted to Malevsky.33 
　On June 11, Japan’s Foreign Minister Kato Takaaki (1860–1926) officially informed 
Malevsky about the readiness of the Japanese Government to supply Russia with 
the rifles. It was an eventual answer of Japan to Russia’s request from January 14, 
1915, concerning provision of Russia with 300,000 rifles. The selling of the weapons 
from the mobilization stocks was unprecedented in both the history of the Japanese 
War Ministry and of Russo-Japanese relations. One week after the transmission of 
Japan’s official answer to Russia, Kato wired – in Malevsky’s words – to Ambassador 
Inoue Katsunosuke (1861–1929) in London that the cession of 100,000 rifles “from the 
mobilization stores of Japanese Army should not be considered as an accomplishment 
of some kind of order. This provision was realized by the motives of political character 
as exclusion, and Japan can supply neither Russia nor Great Britain with any rifles 
until the replenishment of the Japanese Army’s needs, that is in the next two years.”34 
Metaphorically speaking, the rifles were understood as a ‘honey-cake’ for the loyal 
position of Russian government to the Japanese expansive policy in China.
33　AVPRI, f. 150, op. 493, d. 1869, ll. 125, 135; NIDS, file T.3-6.39, pp. 435-462; NGB, 1915, Ch. 3, vol. 2, 
pp. 1003-1004.
34　NGB, 1915, Ch. 3, vol. 2, p. 1020; AVPRI, f.133, op. 470, d. 82, ll. 108, 115.
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Reorganization of Russia’s Armaments Purchasing in Japan: Russo-Japanese 
Relations at the Crossroads (June – September 1915)
　Japanese military help was useful and valuable to Russia, but, of course, could not 
satisfy her needs completely. That is why, in the end of May, soon after receiving the 
information about the provision of 100,000 rifles, the Russian Government applied to 
Japan again with the new request for 200,000 rifles and 300 million cartridges, 120,000 
shells per month for 75-mm Arisaka field guns, heavy cannons and 120 field guns.35 It 
should be noted that the tactic of Russian Government (and its readiness to give some 
services and concessions to Japan) became more and more sophisticated. From the 
beginning Russia showed the readiness to thank Japan for any kind of support, including 
things that were considered to be unnecessary as some trophies. Additionally, in order 
to get rifles and heavy artillery, the Russian Government agreed to buy some minor 
weapons, war materials and ammunitions. Besides, at the end of 1914 Russia had already 
shown a readiness to pay all overhead costs for the accomplishment of the Japanese 
Government’s order to produce rifles at the Japanese arsenals, in case of immediate 
provision of some quantity of rifles from the army’s stocks, and even had agreed to 
supply Japanese arsenals with some necessary materials. In spring of 1915 this initiative 
did not bring any results, but the negotiations continued in this way. As a result, in the 
beginning of June, Japan’s War Ministry had agreed to produce some quantity of rifles 
and cartridges at its Arsenals with the precondition that Russia supply Japan with such 
materials as zinc, nickel, tin, spring and instrumental steel.36 
　At the same time, the industrial and financial circles of Japan started their ‘silent 
pressure’ campaign on the Russian Government. By the middle of May, General 
Samoilov had learned from the representative of the Okura Company that the Japanese 
Government could sell to Russia between 200 and 300 thousand Arisaka rifles if Russia 
would agree to concede the southern part of the CER, from Taolaizhao to Kuanchengzi, 
to the South Manchuria Railway Company.37 On May 30, Ambassador Motono Ichiro 
(1862–1918) reported to Kasumigaseki that in his opinion, there was a splendid chance 
to resolve this railway issue, remained from the Russo-Japanese War, if the Japanese 
Government was ready to provide wider military assistance to Russia. In Motono’s 
35　NGB, 1915, Ch. 3, vol. 2, pp. 1014-1015.
36　NGB, 1915, Ch. 3, vol. 2, pp. 1017-1019; AVPRI, f. 133, op. 470, d. 82, l. 117.
37　RGVIA, f. 2000, op. 1, d. 4454, ll. 173, 175.
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view, the providing of all possible military support towards Russia, in order to secure 
the victory of Britain, France and Russia in the War, was “both an obligation and an 
advantageous political course for Japan” in these circumstances. Importantly, the British 
Government also asked Japan to give Russia adequate military support.38 The Japanese 
Government did not take any decisive measures in this direction, but at the end of June 
‘the Elder Statesmen’, influenced by these reports by Motono, had started an active 
campaign for the Russo-Japanese political rapprochement.39 
　As a result of the tough talks, restarted in Tokyo between Colonel M. P. Podtyagin 
and the representatives of the Japanese War Ministry, in the middle of July, the 
Japanese Government informed Russians that it could 1) produce in one year about 
62 million cartridges and 130,000 rifles, starting from the December of 1915, 2) supply 
Russia with 46,000 shells for heavy artillery and 80,000 shells for 75-mm field guns per 
month in the next six months, 3) prolong from the October the contract, signed by 
Hermonius, concerning 3-inch shrapnel, and produce additionally 1.2 million shells, 4) 
supply Russia with fifteen 28-cm howitzers with shells and four 24-cm coastal cannons.40 
By the beginning of August, the conditions of new contracts were generally agreed 
between Russian and Japanese military authorities, but the situation on the Russian 
Front had been changing speedily. 
　The beginning of August for the Russian Army became the most crucial bottom-
point, when it was forced to start a large-scale retreat because of a lack of weapons. The 
fall of Warsaw was the symbolic sign of the Russian Army’s problems. In this critical 
situation, on August 10, the Russian Government had taken a resolution, according to 
which the transfer of the CER’s part in the Japanese sphere of influence was considered 
to be possible in case of provision of some quantity of rifles from Japan. On August 
11, Sazonov met with the Japanese Ambassador, and informed him about the Russian 
Government’s wish to be supplied additionally with 1 million rifles with necessary 
store of cartridges. Sazonov explained about an extremely difficult situation on the 
North-Western Front, and added that in this situation Japan was the only country that 
could help Russia. Of course, he did not forget to hint that Russia was ready to give 
some valuable concessions to Japan in Manchuria, according to the new Government’s 
38　NGS, file 5.1.5.17-4, Honpō ni oite kakkoku heiki juhin sonota chōtatsu kankei zakken: Ei-Futsu-
Ro-no bu (The Materials Relating to the Purchasing of the Weapons and Other Products in Japan 
by Different States: Britain, France, Russia), p. 144.
39　See: Baryshev, Nichiro dōmei no jidai, 1914-1917, pp. 134-137. 
40　NGB, 1915, Ch. 3, vol. 2, pp. 1027-1029; AVPRI, f. 133, op. 470, d. 82, l. 118.
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resolution. The comments of Ambassador Motono to this meeting with Sazonov were as 
follows:
　　　 　Today’s Russian request is a result of consultations between the Allied 
Powers. If Japan does not respond to this request, and one of the Allied Powers 
is defeated, a part of the rights that Japanese had taken in China will turn to 
dust. On the other hand, I am sure that if the Allies have a victory without any 
cooperation from our side, Japan’s voice in the peace treaty negotiations will 
weaken greatly. If the Japanese Government considers that there is no menace to 
peace in the Far East, and decides to supply Russia with a part of the weapons 
from its defence stocks, I am sure that there will be an opportunity to resolve 
the question concerning the railway from Sungari to Changchun. The words of 
the Russian Minister that Russia is ready to give some compensation should be, 
probably, interpreted in this way.41 
　In view of Russia’s defeats, Great Britain’s Government was also forced to take 
some extraordinary measures. Until this time, London did not accept the idea of 
Russo-Japanese Rapprochement, preferring to control Japan through the Anglo-
Japanese Alliance, but in the middle of August Edward Grey (1862–1933) had decided 
to allow Russia and Japan to become closer, if this rapprochement would result in the 
enhancement of Japan’s military support towards Russia.42 By this time, Minister Kato, 
an adherent of a strong orientation to London, was replaced, and the former Japanese 
Ambassador Ishii Kikujiro (1866–1945) was put at this post. 
　On August 19, British, French and Russian Ambassadors visited Prime-Minister 
Okuma and requested Japan’s government to supply Russia with possible quantity of 
arms and weapons. However, the Japanese government could not and did not wish to 
change plans of arms supply, prepared by this time. On the same day, Okuma wired 
to Petrograd a telegram, which included the following points: 1) Japan could not supply 
Russia with rifles and cartridges, except 150,000 rifles of a new model with 100 million of 
cartridges and 50,000 rifles of an old model, 2) New model rifles will be produced at the 
Japanese Arsenals according with the special mobilization plan and will be transferred 
to Russia in one year, 3) The important condition of the contract was supplying of Japan 
by the Russian government with necessary materials and metals. That is, in contrast 
with the situation during the Sino-Japanese negotiations, Japan’s Government had not 
41　NGB, 1915, Ch. 3, vol. 2, pp. 1039-1040. 
42　NGB, 1915, Ch. 3, vol. 2, pp. 1042-1048. 
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decided to put this question “on the political grounds”, as Russia and other Allies wished. 
That meant that purely European problems were alien to the Japanese statesmen, who 
pursued clear tasks relating to the political and economic expansion of Japan in the Far 
East.43 
　Eventually, from the beginning of August until the end of October, Colonel Podtyagin 
concluded some large-scale contracts with Taihei Kumiai. According to the contracts, 
the Russian Government ordered from Japan 1.2 million 3-inch shells, 43 heavy artillery 
guns and 92,300 shells, 120 75-mm Arisaka field guns and 860,000 shrapnel shells for 
them, 150,000 new model rifles with 84 million cartridges (contract No. 578), 50,000 old 
model rifles with small quantity of cartridges, and even 30,000 hand-grenades. The total 
sum of these orders is considered to reach approximately 65 million yen.44 Additionally, 
in the middle of August, Captain Voskresensky signed a contract with Japan’s Navy 
about the provision of 37,000 Arisaka rifles and 10 million of cartridges; these rifles were 
to be transferred to Russia by the end of March of 1916.45 These orders were valuable 
for the Russian Army, but their effect was delayed greatly, and it could not influence the 
Russian Army as the previous orders made by General Hermonius in the first months of 
the War. 
　As a matter of fact, by this time, the War Ministry of Japan had almost exhausted its 
extra-resources, finished the process of modernization of the army and had no plans to 
share its mobilization weapons with Russia. For the same reason, the trade syndicate 
Taihei Kumiai had no more opportunities to resell weapons to Russia. At the same 
time, some kind of desperation in foreign military supply, and the absence of perspective 
towards the end of the War, made the Russians throw all of their energy and resources 
into the development of Russia’s own military industry. Of course, an extension of 
industrial production in Russia required both machines and different raw materials, 
previously imported mostly from Germany. In these circumstances, both the Russian 
Government and private factories began the massive purchasing of copper, brass, zinc, 
antimony and other materials in Japan. Large-scale orders were given by GAU to such 
industrial companies as Takata, Kuhara, and Furukawa. Supposedly, the total sum of 
43　NGB, 1915, Ch. 3, vol. 2, pp. 1058-1059, 1069-1070, 1072; MOEI, Vol. 8, Ch. 2 (Moscow, 1935), pp. 
100 (ref. 1), 120-122, 141-142. 
44　NIDS, file T3-6.39, pp. 39-41, 173-175, 179-186, 602-611; GARF, f. 676, op. 1, d. 352, ll. 7-9, 13-15; 
AVPRI, f. 133, op. 470, d. 82, ll. 185, 235; NGS, file 5.1.5.17-7, Vol. 2, pp. 648-649, 656-657.
45　NIDS, file Т .3-106.563, pp. 47-55, 94-129.
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these ‘metallic’ orders reached about 40-50 million yen by the end of 1915.46 Moreover, as 
it was noted above, the Russian War Ministry had to supply the Japanese Arsenals with 
different materials that were necessary for the production of the rifles, and it is known 
that eventually GAU had paid only to the Okura Company about 1,400,000 yen for zinc, 
nickel, lead and spring steel.47 
　The summer of 1915, accompanied by a chain of Russia’s military defeats, brought 
about great changes in the Russian state organization, and the Russian bourgeoisie 
got an opportunity to take active part in the arms purchasing activities abroad. In this 
situation, Vladivostok’s Bryner, Kuznetsov & Co. managed to conclude some large-scale 
contracts with the Russian government concerning arms supply, using its connections 
at Petrograd, especially in the newly created Central War Industrial Committee, and 
its cooperative relations with the Japanese economic circles. The most impressive of 
them was the order for 4 million charged time-fuses for 3-inch artillery shells (worth 19.2 
million yen) that was placed on the Japanese market in August 1915.48
　All Japanese orders, made by GAU by June 1915, were fulfilled by autumn of 1915. 
All weapons, bought by GAU in Japan, were of quite good quality and of quite moderate 
price. The rifles were not new ones, and were not provided with the necessary quantity 
of cartridges, but they could be used by reserve and guard regiments or on the second 
line of the front. As for artillery guns, which were short of shells also, they could be used 
instead of Russian guns at the minor parts of the Front and at the fortresses. Obviously, 
Japanese rifles and artillery could not change greatly the situation on the Eastern Front, 
but they could help in eliminating the front breakthroughs and bring to the Russian 
army “a small respite.”49 According to the author’s calculation, by the autumn of 1915, at 
least ten percent of rifles and five percent of heavy artillery guns at the Russian front 
were of Japanese origin. The very important purchase for Russia was the 3-inch shells 
46　NGS, file 5.1.5.17-7, vol. 3, pp. 1395-1410, vol. 4, pp. 2021-2022, 2035, 2099-2119, 2130-2143; AVPRI, 
f. 133, op. 470, d. 82, l. 161; RGVIA, f. 499, op. 5, d. 429, ll. 5, 24; Sakamoto, Zaibatsu to teikokushugi, 
pp. 168-169.
47　Okura Archives, file 23.2-88, Robun keiyakusho (The Contracts in Russian).
48　See: Baryshev, “The Russo-Japanese “Arms Alliance” and the Bilateral Commercial Relations 
during the First World War”, Shimane Journal of North East Asian Research, No. 23, March 2012, 
pp. 193-215 (in Japanese).
49　Fyodorov, Oruzheinoe delo, p. 19; Manikovsky, Boevoe snabzhenie russkoi armii v mirovuyu 
voinu, p. 213. See also: Alfred Knox, With the Russian Army, 1914-1917: Being Chiefly Extracts 
From the Diary of a Military Attaché, Vol. 1 (London, Hutchinson & Co., 1921), pp. 168, 216-217.
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and their components, which played a positive role in the 1915 summer campaign, when 
‘the shell-shortage’ occurred. The powder, purchased through Mitsui Bussan from the 
DuPont Company and from the Iwai Company, also contributed greatly to enhancing 
efforts on the Eastern Front. In contrast to the Japanese orders, the contracts with the 
British Vickers, the American Remington and The Purchasing Canadian Company were 
not fulfilled properly, and this was the first reason why the value of Japanese rifles and 
guns was re-estimated greatly in the late summer and autumn of 1915. In short, the 
crucial and tragic months of the summer of 1915 had shown that Japan was the only 
diligent and honest supplier of weapons for the Russian army. Baron Motono, who knew 
well that American supplying business was too late, suggested that it was strategically 
profitable to Japan to expand its supply of weapons to Russia, and to support the Allies 
in war against Germany.50 
The Financial Issues of the Military Cooperation and the Japanese Mission 
of Grand Duke George Mikhailovich (October 1915 – January 1916)
　The problems of Russo-Japanese military cooperation were not merely of political, but 
also of economic-financial character. Russia’s financial resources were strictly limited, 
and this factor restrained greatly the Russian purchasing efforts in Japan. The first 
foreign orders were supported with both the Russian gold abroad and the credits that 
the British government opened for Russia at the beginning of the War. On September 
30, 1915, Russian minister of Finance, P. L. Bark (1869–1937), concluded a new agreement 
about the large one-year credit of 300 million pounds sterling (approximately 250 million 
roubles / yen per month). Unfortunately, the greater part of this credit (about 205 million 
roubles per month) should be used for the payments by the contracts, concluded by 
October, 1915. Moreover, for the payments of the contracts, which had been concluded 
earlier in Japan, only 6 million pounds (60 million yen) was prepared. According to the 
Russo-British financial agreement, the Russian Government had to ship abroad 400 
million gold roubles (approximately, one fourth of all Russia’s gold stock).51 
　In comparison with Great Britain, at the beginning of the Great War, Japanese 
finances were not so stable as to allow for loans to Russia of large sums of capital. 
50　NGB, 1915, Ch. 3, Vol. 2, pp. 1061, 1072-1075. 
51　A. L. Sidorov, Finansovoe polozhenie Rossii v gody Pervoi mirovoi voiny (1914–1917) (Moskva, 
1960), pp. 207-210, 224-283, 537-541; RGVIA, f. 499, op. 5, d. 395, ll. 122-123; MOEI, Vol. 8, Ch. 2, pp. 
162-164, 177-178, 204-205, 225-231, 255-258, 408-410, 418- 421, 433-437. 
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Japan was a pure debtor, who tried to cope with its own financial problems. In these 
circumstances, Japan oriented itself primarily for the credits that were opened for the 
Russian Government in London, Paris and New York. However, by autumn of 1915 
Japan’s financial position in the world market had strengthened enough, and being 
afraid of the pounds sterling’s rate fall, and trying to support Japan’s national currency, 
the government decided to accumulate money in Japan’s banks. As mentioned above, 
at the beginning of the War, Japanese economic circles strived to get money abroad 
in foreign currency, but now they had changed their strategy and decided to promote 
yen payments in Russo-Japanese financial relations. By the middle of September 1915, 
the Japanese government prepared – together with the five-year arms supply plan – 
the first draft of credit agreement with Russia, and one of the conditions was shipping 
of Russian gold to Japan. Russia could not agree to this condition, but eventually Japan 
managed to procure large sums of the Russian gold.52 
　On October 19, the Japanese government made an official announcement about its 
joining to the British-Franco-Russian London declaration concerning separate peace 
treaty question, signed on September 5, 1914. That was a meaningful political step 
to the strengthening of strategic relations with the Entente’s countries, and a sort of 
preparation to the future peace conference. Importantly, the participation of Japan in the 
European War mainly took a form of the military support of Russia as Japan’s nearest 
neighbour and ‘the weak link’ of the coalition. In other words, Japan supported Russia 
in order to exaggerate its contribution to the Allies’ war efforts. Naturally, Japanese 
nationalists tried to use European Allies’ need for Japan’s military support of Russia in 
order to open the way to a more independent political course in world affairs. At the 
same time, Yamagata’s group still strived to realize the plan of complete normalization of 
relations with Russia, in order to escape international isolation and to prevent German-
Japanese tensions in post-war time. In other words, they considered the joining to the 
London declaration as a prologue to the Russo-Japanese Alliance, which should give to 
Japan new international guarantees. The Japanese military representative at Russian 
Army’s Headquarters, General Nakajima, had managed to trigger the mechanism of ‘the 
Court Diplomacy’ in the bilateral relations. 
　As a rule, after the inglorious war of 1904-1905 the Russian diplomacy did not 
52　NGB, 1915, Ch. 3, vol. 2, pp. 1084-1088; NGS, file 5.1.5.17-7, vol. 2, pp. 662-664, 747-748, 752-758, 
812, 831, 875, 1022-1026; NIDS, file T3-6.39, pp. 235-236; MOEI, vol. 8, ch. 2, pp. 469-470; AVPRI, f. 
133, op. 470, d. 82, ll. 170, 176-177, 198, 200; Sidorov, Finansovoe polozhenie Rossii, pp. 397, 399. 
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seem eager for direct rapprochement with Japan and tried to enhance these relations 
through London. However, the precise fulfilment of the armaments supply orders by 
the Japanese government and companies, in concert with the disruption of the same 
obligations by European and American suppliers, led to the relative revision of the 
Russian strategic and diplomatic course by autumn of 1915. Japan’s joining to the London 
Declaration resulted in a kind of thaw in Russo-Japanese relations. By the way, at the 
end of 1915, Great Britain had agreed to hand over to Russia all Arisaka rifles that it had (a 
bit less than 130,000 with 68 million of cartridges), 37 million non-charged cartridges for 
the Japanese rifles, ordered from the Japanese Arsenals in spring of 1915, and even had 
agreed to supply Russia in the nearest future with 45 million cartridges per month. In 
these circumstances, Russia’s military Headquarters decided to concentrate all Japanese 
rifles on the Northern Front and to organise supplying them with cartridges.53 
　At the middle of December, the Russian Emperor decided to dispatch to Japan with 
a special mission his uncle once removed, Grand Duke George Mikhailovich (1863–1919). 
This decision was a consequence of the mere talk between General Nakajima and the 
Tsar’s ordinary surgeon S. P. Fyodorov (1869–1936), when Japanese representative said 
that “the dispatch of some Grand Duke to Japan could lead to the extension of Japanese 
arms supply.” A formal goal of the mission was to transmit to the Japanese Emperor 
Coronation congratulations and gratitude for the Japanese military cooperation. The 
Grand Duke brought with him a Special Memorandum concerning necessary arms 
orders. In this Memorandum the following arms and weapons (“the means of national 
defense”) were enlisted: 1) 45 million of rifles cartridges per month, 2) 400,000 rifles of 
new model with at the minimum 300 cartridges per rifle, 3) 5,000 machine-guns, 4) 6-inch 
(15-cm) speedy artillery guns and 8-9-inch (20-24-cm) artillery guns for supplying of 36 
artillery squadrons, forty-eight 11-12-inch heavy guns, 5) 500 or 550 Arisaka field guns 
of 1907 model, 6) 120 mountain guns, 7) Five or six million puds (pud is a Russian unit of 
weight, equal to 16.38 kilogram) of barbed wire. The content of the Memorandum shows 
that the cartridge and the rifles question were the most important ones for Russia at 
this moment. The supply of Russian Army with artillery guns was the question of the 
53　Fyodorov, Oruzheinoe delo, pp. 19, 21, 26, 51, 61-63, 72, 74; Manikovsky, Boevoe snabzhenie 
russkoi armii v mirovuyu voinu, pp. 204-205, 213, 291-292; Barsukov, Artilleriya Russkoi armii 
(1900–1917), vol. 1, p. 359; Ibid, vol. 2, pp. 278, 286-287, 293, 299-300; Zalyubovskii, Snabzhenie 
Russkoi Armii v Velikuyu voinu, pp. 105-107; A. L. Sidorov, Ekonomicheskoe polozhenie Rossii v 
gody Pervoi mirovoi voiny (Moscow, 1973), pp. 297-309.
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second importance.54
　On December 25 the mission took the way through Siberia, Manchuria and Korea to 
Japan. Japanese elite (Yamagata’s group) understood the great political meaning of this 
visit and tried to do the best for the reception the Grand Duke. The Japanese suite of the 
Grand Duke was headed by the President of Russo-Japanese Association Prince Kan’in 
Kotohito (1865–1945) and Governor-General of Korea Terauchi Masatake (1852–1919). 
Japanese representatives were specially sent to Changchun, Mukden and Antung for 
the meeting of the Grand Duke. Moreover, the two battleships Kashima and Shikishima 
were sent to Pusan, in order to take His Highness to Kobe. On January 12, 1916, the 
Grand Duke and his companions arrived to their final destination, Tokyo55.
　Interestingly, on January 8, two other battleships (the Tokiwa and the Chitose) 
entered into Maizuru port. They arrived from Vladivostok and were loaded with the 
Russian gold bullion worth 100 million roubles. Onboard the Chitose there were clerks 
of the Russian State Bank, who were charged to oversee the transportation of the 
1,247 gold bars, packed in 232 boxes, with a value equal to 20 million roubles, to Japan. 
The gold was sold to Japan by the Government of Great Britain as ‘an award’ for the 
transportation of the Russian gold bullion from Vladivostok to Vancouver.56 
　Emperor Nikolai II hoped that the Grand Duke’s Japanese Mission would result in 
some progress in arms supply question, but the formal negotiations, held in Tokyo 
during this visit, were carried upon the draft of the Russo-Japanese alliance, prepared 
by Russia. The task, settled before Kozakov, was to propose to Japan a conclusion of 
the new Russo-Japanese political agreement, in order to make Japan promise support 
as an ally to Russia in the struggle against Germany. That is, it was necessary for 
Russia to involve Japan in the Allies camp. It was considered as a further development 
of the relations, delineated by the joining of Japan to the London Declaration. Russian 
Foreign Minister Sazonov suggested that the conclusion of such an alliance treaty 
would contribute to the creation of new more cooperative relations between countries. 
According to the Russian draft of the treaty, Japan should supply Russia with weapons 
54　GARF, f. 676, op. 1, d. 362, l. 11; Taishō shoki Yamagata Aritomo danwa hikki (The records of 
conversations with Yamagata Aritomo at Early Taisho period) (Tokyo, 1981), pp. 87-88. 
55　Baryshev, Nichiro dōmei no jidai, pp. 165, 171; Baryshev, “Iaponskaia missiia velikogo kniazia 
Georgiia Mikhailovicha,” pp. 59-61.
56　Saitō Seiji, “Nihon kaigun ni yoru roshia kinkai no yusō, 1916-1917 nen (The Transportation of 
the Russia’s Specie Gold by Japanese Navy, 1916-1917)”, pp. 158-164; NIDS, file T.3.113-570, pp. 486, 
492-493, 504, 536, 564-565, 645. 
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within its capabilities, and Russia should hand over to Japan as ‘a gesture of the good 
will’ the southern part of the CER (approximately, 82 kilometers), located in the Japanese 
sphere of interest in Manchuria. It was a compensation that Russia was ready to pay for 
the more intensive arms supply.57 
　Certainly, the Japanese government and its economic circles were keenly interested 
in obtaining the southern part of the CER, but they did not intend to supply Russia, 
a potential enemy, with its mobilizational weapons. The course of the Japanese War 
Ministry was defined clearly through the instructions of the newly appointed Deputy-
Chief of the General Staff, Lieutenant-General Tanaka Giichi (1864–1929), which were 
sent at the beginning of November 1915 to the Japanese military agents abroad. 
　　　 　The influence of the European War has been spreading constantly and will 
gradually penetrate into the East. Naturally, at this time, the Allied Powers will 
strive by any means to involve Japan in the conflict and/or will demand the 
provision of our weapons from the war stocks. However, the participation of the 
Empire [Japan – E. B.] in the mutual military operations, or the supplying [of the 
Allies] with our war weapons, might darken the international future of the Empire 
and reduce her power. That is why [in future] the Empire, as previously, will try 
to stand beyond the conflict to accumulate her military powers, will observe the 
course of events deliberately in order to grasp all essential strategic opportunities, 
and will render indirect assistance to the friendly nations as far as her national 
spare capacities allow [kokka yoryoku no oyobu kagiri].58 
　In other words, the Japan’s military circles were not going to supply Russia with arms 
from their war stocks, and it was a principal strategy of the Japanese Government. That 
is why the Grand Duke’s mission did not result in any meaningful breakthrough in the 
arms supply question. Everything that the mission managed to do was to get consent of 
the Japanese War Ministry to transfer 100 mountain guns and 20 million rifle cartridges, 
and to produce additionally 2 million 3-inch shells for the Russian Army. However, it 
should be mentioned that all these offers had been generally prepared already by the 
end of 1915, before the Grand Duke’s visit to Japan.59 During the Grand Duke’s visit, 
Japan’s bank syndicate had agreed to acquire the Russian government’s bonds of 50 
57　NGB, 1916, vol. 1, pp. 107-108; MOEI, vol. 10, pp. 259-260; Baryshev, Nichiro dōmei no jidai, pp. 
161-164, 167-171, 177.
58　NGB, 1915, Ch. 3, vol. 2, pp. 1100-1101. 
59　GARF, f. 601 (the Emperor Nikolai II), op. 1, d. 796, ll. 1-9; Baryshev, “Iaponskaia missiia velikogo 
kniazia Georgiia Mikhailovicha,” 71; NIDS, file T3-6.39, pp. 280-282. 
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million yen value, but that was actually influenced by the above-mentioned shipping of 
the 20 million gold roubles to Japan. Interestingly, 15 million yen from this 50 million 
credit was to be used for payment as the special operation concerning the casting of 
Russian silver coins (their total nominal value was 21.5 million roubles) at the Osaka 
Mint. In short, as a result of the Russo-Japanese credit operation, realized formally on 
February 7, Russia received only 35 million yen that could be used for payments on the 
arms orders in Japan.60 The Grand Duke’s Mission paved the way to bilateral diplomatic 
negotiations concerning the conclusion the Russo-Japanese Alliance Treaty, which 
started at the end of February at Petrograd. 
Russo-Japanese Diplomatic Rapprochement and the Growing Political 
Dissension (February – June 1916)
　At the beginning of the War, the central role in arms supply movement in Japan was 
played by Taihei Kumiai and, especially, its leading member Mitsui Company. However, 
in the late summer of 1915, when the situation in the Russian Front had worsened 
greatly, Mitsui began to show some reluctance to engage in the large-scale bargains 
with the Russian government. In this situation, the leading role in supplying Russia 
with arms and ammunition was taken by the Okura Company, which was ready to 
undergo some risky operations with Russia. The Russian Government valued the trade 
activities of Okura and strived to support them, as much as possible, to get some extra 
weapons from Japan. As a matter of fact, Okura was a leading force in the movement 
for the acquiring the Russian bonds as a payment for the arms and ammunitions orders. 
Between the end of 1915 and May of 1916, Okura concluded some large-scale contracts 
with GIU concerning soldier equipment such as boots (750,000 pairs), cloth (2.7 million 
arshins), soldier underwear (200,000 sets) and the leather cartridge-bags (2 million) for 
the total sum of over 20 million yen. All these contracts were based on the “deferred 
terms of payment”, according to which Russia was to pay with one-year bonds issued 
on the same conditions as those of the Russo-Japanese agreement from February 7. The 
Russian Government was keenly interested in Okura’s support in the Japanese market, 
and even decided to give to the company special commission (about 134,240 yen), 
allowing Okura to resell silver, belonging to the Japanese Government (according to the 
contract, 194.891 tons; eventually 177.937 tons) to Russia, despite of the fact that it could 
60　MOEI, vol. 10 (Moscow, 1938), pp. 145, 236-238, 302; Sidorov, Finansovoe polozhenie Rossii, p. 400. 
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be purchased directly.61 
　Another active player in the arms supply business was the Kuhara Mining Company, 
which also was ready to undertake some risky operations with the Russian government. 
In the middle of December 1915, industrialist Kuhara Fusanosuke (1869–1965) proposed 
to Russia to produce 600,000 rifles with immediate provision of 100,000 rifles. This 
was a newly elaborated plan concerning the mobilization of private Japanese industry, 
and the War Ministry of Japan was directly involved in these schemes. As Kuhara 
said, he planned to obtain from the War Ministry 100,000 rifles instead of 10 million 
yen investments that the Ministry should make for the building of the new Arsenal. 
However, the Russian Government refused this idea, because of a shortage of money 
and because the plan was very speculative and suspicious (its total sum was equal to 100 
million yen, and the prices were two or three times more expensive than the average 
prices at the beginning of the War).62 This plan was never realised, but it demonstrated 
the ways in which the Russo-Japanese cooperation in the arms supply question could 
be extended. Since the autumn of 1915, the Kuhara Company not only actively engaged 
in supplying Russia with copper, but also supported the trade operation concerning 
the production of 4 million time-fuses, which were ordered by GAU in Japan through 
Vladivostok’s businessman J. I. Briner (1849–1920).63 As a result, during the Great War 
the Kuhara Company developed and expanded its world markets greatly. 
　Furthermore, by the spring of 1916, the Russian military authorities managed to 
establish close relations with the Naval Ministry of Japan. From September 1915 the 
Ministry actively used its Arsenals for the production of arms for Russia. By May 
1916, the total sum of such orders (400,000 22 second time-fuses, 10,500 shells for heavy 
naval artillery guns, 120 heavy guns of 4.2-inch calibre with 120,000 shells, 100 cannons 
of different calibre with shells) reached to 12 million yen. Some of these were made to 
61　Okura Archives, file 23.2-102, Robun keiyakusho genpon (The originals of the Contracts in 
Russian); file 23.2-35, Ginkai baibai keiyakusho (The Contract, relating to the purchasing of silver); 
file 23.3-9-2, Dai-9-ki kessan uchiwake-hyo (The Balance Sheets for the 9th period); file 23.3-10-2, 
Dai-10-ki kessan uchiwake-hyo (The Balance Sheets for the 9th period); file 23.2-89, Kaigun keiyaku 
utsushi: Taisho 5 nen (The copies of the Naval Ministry’s contracts, 1916); Taketomi Tokitoshi, 
Ōkuma naikaku zaisei kaisōroku (Recollections about the Financial Policy of the Okuma Cabinet), 
pp. 37-38.
62　AVPRI, f. 133, op. 470, d. 82, ll. 254, 268, 290-291, 293, 325; MOEI, vol. 10, p. 72 (ref. 1), p. 73 (ref. 1). 
63　Baryshev, “The Russo-Japanese “Arms Alliance” and the Bilateral Commercial Relations,” pp. 
202-215 (in Japanese).
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meet the GAU’s needs. Above all, in March 1916 the Naval Ministry agreed to make 
a large-scale bargain with the Russian Government and handed over to Russia three 
former Russian warships the Poltava (Tango), the Peresvet (Sagami) and the Varyag 
(Soya), captured during the Russo-Japanese War. More importantly, the Naval Ministry 
had agreed to the payment for this operation with the Russian Government’s bonds 
(15.5 million yen). The warships had been handed over to the Russian Fleet solemnly in 
Vladivostok on April 4.64 
　As for the orders of the Russian War Ministry, made through the syndicate Taihei 
Kumiai between December 1915 and May 1916, Russia purchased from Japan 6,000 
Arisaka rifles and 500 carbines of 1897 model, 120 Arisaka field guns with 150,000 shells, 
ordered additionally 30,000 Arisaka rifles of new model with 8.1 million cartridges, 2 
million of 3-inch shells, 100 Arisaka mountain guns and 5 howitzers of 10.5-cm calibre 
with 2,000 shells. Supposedly, the total sum of these orders reached approximately 65 
million yen, however about 85 percent of the sum accounted for the deal for the 3-inch 
shells. It is known that Taihei Kumiai had bought all of these weapons for 56.62 million 
yen, but charged Russia 56.86 million yen for just the 3-inch shells.65 
　As noted above, Prince Yamagata, who considered the conclusion of Russo-Japanese 
Alliance a necessary element for enhancing Japan’s positions in China and Manchuria, 
skilfully used the need of the Russian Army in Japan’s military support and managed to 
pave a way to the bilateral diplomatic negotiations that began in the end of February, 
1916. Undoubtedly, for Russia the Alliance had significance primarily in the sense of 
enhancing Japanese military support during the War. The Russian Government was not 
going to support Japanese expansion in the Far East, and the involving of Japan into the 
active struggle against Germany should weaken Japan’s position in Manchuria. During 
the Grand Duke’s Japanese visit, Kozakov made a proposal to the Japanese diplomatists 
to hand over the southern part of the CER, located in the Japanese sphere of interest, 
if Japan would supply Russia with some quantity of rifles. In the middle of February, 
Japan’s military authorities hinted to Ambassador Malevsky that Japan was ready to 
supply Russia with about 100,000 or 150,000 rifles in that case. In the instructions from 
Minister Ishii to Ambassador Motono, decoded in the Russian Foreign Ministry, it was 
stipulated that the Japanese Government would hand over to Russia 120,000 rifles and 
64　NIDS, file T.3-106.563, pp. 131-286, 296-409, 422-461; R. M. Mel’nikov, Kreiser “Varyag” (Leningrad, 
1983), pp. 228-235; Baryshev, Nichiro dōmei no jidai, 1914-1917, pp. 212-213.
65　AVPRI, f. 133, op. 470, d. 82, l. 283; AVPRI, f. 134 (Arkhiv “Voina”), op. 473, d. 152, ll. 24 ob., 26-27 
ob.; NIDS, file T3-6.39, pp. 613-617-2. 
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60 million cartridges, if the discussed railway question could be solved.66 However, 
at this time, such ‘interchange of the mutual interests’, which resembled a mere 
commercial bargain, already had no great attraction for Russia. The value of the rifles 
and cartridges, calculated even by speculative prices, was worth a maximum of about 
20 million yen. The main problem the Russian Government met with was one of finance, 
and during these diplomatic talks Russia made an attempt to solve this question again. 
　On February 21, the British Government officially informed the Russian Government 
that it had decided to extend ‘the Japanese credit’ from 6 to 9 million pounds sterling. 
However, this sum could not cover all Russian orders in Japan, which were calculated 
at the beginning of February to be 289 million yen (the former orders, payment by 
which was partially finished, were valued approximately in 120 million yen, and new 
supposed orders needed approximately 169 million yen).67 On March 18, at the meeting 
of the Ministers’ Council, the special resolution of the Russian government, concerning 
the credit question, was adopted. The resolution, named “About providing with proper 
credits [Russian] foreign orders” (“Ob obespechenii sootvetstvuyushchimi kreditami 
proizvodimykh za granitsei zagotovlenii”), indicated clearly that there was a necessity “to 
pay special attention to the question of the placement of our foreign orders in Japan”: 
　　　 　... Japanese orders differ from any other purchasing that we do on the foreign 
markets. Putting aside their relative – in comparison with the prices, overrated 
beyond measure on the American and, especially, on British markets – cheapness, 
orders given to the Japanese factories are not only fulfilled on time, but in some 
cases are finished in advance. After all, concerning the quality the Japanese 
manufactures there is no room for improvement, and in this respect too they 
differ favourably from many products purchased on the other foreign markets. 
Finally, an especially valuable distinctive feature of the Japanese orders is the 
speediness and convenience of their delivery, because Japan has a lot of small 
vessels and their freights are very cheap.68
　The Ministers’ Council decided to give special instructions to the Minister of Finance 
“to enter in proper negotiations with the British and Japanese Governments about the 
further provision, with appropriate credits, of Russian orders in foreign markets.” The 
document, signed by the Ministers, was approved by the Emperor on April 4.69
66　MOEI, vol. 10, pp. 205-207, 223, 567-570; AVPRI, f. 134, op. 473, d. 152, l. 31. 
67　MOEI, vol. 10, pp. 118, 121-123, 144-147, 236-238.
68　Sidorov, Finansovoe polozhenie Rossii, pp. 539.  
69　Sidorov, Finansovoe polozhenie Rossii, pp. 540-541.  
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　At the beginning of April, Finance Minister Bark met with Motono, in order to inform 
him officially that the Russian Government needed large Japanese credits up to 315 
million yen, in full accordance with “The List of the Proposed New Orders in Japan” 
(“Vedomost’ predpolozhennykh novykh zakazov v Yaponii”), prepared at the Russian War 
Ministry.70 On April 7, Foreign Minister Sazonov informed Malevsky about this initiative 
of the Russian Government and asked Ambassador to give instructions to Chancellor M. S. 
Shchekin (1871–1920) to discuss this question with the Japanese Finance Minister. In his 
telegram Sazonov also stressed the importance of the Japanese market for Russia:
　　　 　Mobilization of all Russian industry could not satisfy in adequate degree 
our needs, caused by the present war. As a result of such situation and a 
lack of some production materials in Russia, we were forced to apply to 
the foreign markets in order to get some commodities. In this relation the 
support of Japan was especially valuable for us, because it was characterised 
with the irreproachable fulf i lment of our orders. Thanks to Japan’s 
geographical position, the import from Japan to Russia through Vladivostok is not 
accompanied with different difficulties and delays, which we have importing from 
other countries.71 
　By that time, Russia had already passed through the peak of her misfortunes, realized 
the crucial role that she played in the Great War, and attempted to use the Allies’ 
dependence on the Russian Army’s combat power. The Russian Government strived 
to use in the arms supply question the interests of the foreign industrial and financial 
circles, which earned great profits from the Russian war orders. In Petrograd it was 
known that the Japanese industrialists and the War Ministry of Japan were keenly 
interested both in new Russian orders and in the acquisition of the southern part of the 
CER.72 In this sense, the relative stabilization at the Russian Front (that was achieved 
primarily thanks to the mobilization of the Russian industry) contributed in some degree 
to the enhancing of the Russian diplomatic course. Russia was not going to give to Japan 
new privileges and make new concessions (except those, promised during the diplomatic 
negotiations in spring of 1916, concerning fishery, custom tariffs, and the CIR), and hoped 
that Japan, as a new Ally, would extend its military support towards Russia. However, 
Japan was interested in the ‘visible’ fruits of the military cooperation and its position on 
70　NGS, file 5.1.5.17-7, vol. 3, pp. 1495-1497, 1519-1529. 
71　AVPRI, f. 134, op. 473, d. 152, l. 18. 
72　AVPRI, f. 134, op. 473, d. 152, l. 8, 8 ob., 16.
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the negotiations was very rigid.73
　By June 1916, the Russian diplomatic and military representatives at Tokyo had been 
changed. Malevsky was withdrawn, and the former Minister in China, V. N. Krupenskii 
(1868–1945), arrived in Japan as the new Ambassador. Furthermore, in February 1916, 
General Samoilov died onboard a steamship on the way to Shanghai; since September 
1915 he was ill with consumption, and his duties were fulfilled by Colonel N. M. Morel 
(1869–1920). The latter was replaced by Colonel V. A. Yakhontov (1881–1978) in January 
1917. The arrival to Tokyo by the beginning of June, 1916, of the commercial agent, K. 
K. Miller (1874–1943), meant that the financial issues of bilateral relations had become of 
paramount importance.
Conclusion: The Russo-Japanese ‘Arms Alliance’ and the fruits of bilateral 
military cooperation
　As previously stated, General Hermonius purchased in Japan different weapons 
on the total sum of 38 million yen; the contracts with the syndicate Taihei Kumiai 
achieved 26.6 million yen. After his return to Russia, in spring of 1915, thanks to Colonel 
Podtyagin, Captain Voskresensky and General Samoilov, the Russian Government 
ordered from Japan additional arms worth up to 9 million yen. It was the first wave of 
the Japanese orders, the cost of which reached approximately to 50 million yen. At the 
same time, GIU concluded many large-scale contracts, both with the private companies 
and the War Ministry of Japan, valued up to 40 million yen. Some small contracts were 
concluded by GVTU, GVSU and other departments of the Russian Government. The 
Russian Government’s purchasing activities at this period were rather spontaneous, but 
relatively successful, because the political and economical circles of Japan were keenly 
interested in selling of weapons and ammunition to Russia. Russia managed to get large 
quantities of old-pattern weapons that were reserved at the stocks of the War Ministry 
of Japan. 
　The second wave of Japanese orders occurred between July and October of 1915. The 
peculiar feature of this period was in fact that the extra-resources of the War Ministry 
of Japan had already been used, and Russia was forced to order from Japanese arsenals 
the production of different arms and munitions. In order to fulfil these orders, special 
organization of production, mobilization of resources, and a relatively long time frame 
73　AVPRI, f. 134, op. 473, d. 152, l. 31. 
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were needed. The sum of the GAU’s arms orders, given at this time through syndicate 
Taihei Kumiai, reached approximately 65 million yen. Moreover, this period coincided 
with the mobilization of the Russian industry, and GAU was forced to purchase different 
metals in Japan up to 40-50 million yen. Interestingly, the orders given by GIU to the 
private companies and the War Ministry of Japan at the beginning of the War met with 
complex problems, and the inspection of cloth and boots continued until the end of 1915. 
Another characteristic feature of this period was the cooperative initiatives of the Naval 
Ministry of Japan to acquire the Russian orders (worth about 12 million yen). It should 
be also noted that Mitsui Bussan, the central member of Taihei Kumiai, seemed to have 
lost interest in arms supply, and the leading role in the business transited to the Okura, 
Takata and Kuhara companies. 
　The third wave of purchasing activities of the Russian Government in Japan took place 
during the period between November 1915 and May 1916. At this time GAU managed 
to order through Taihei Kumiai arms and munitions valued at 65 million yen. However, 
the main portion of these orders was a contract concerning the production of 2 million 
3-inch shells. The Russian Government actively engaged in the purchasing activities in 
Japan, but these efforts met with a lack of money. Partly, it was a consequence of the 
Russo-British financial agreement from September 30, 1915. The issue of the Russian 
bonds (on the total sum of about 50 million yen) in the Japanese market was one of 
the successes the Russian Government achieved in this sphere. However, this relative 
success was accompanied with the shipping of the Russian gold both to America 
and Japan (by March 1917, about 80 million of gold roubles, bought by the Japanese 
Government from the Bank of England, were shipped to Japan). The Okura Company 
and the Naval Ministry of Japan also agreed to take the Russian bonds up to the total 
sum of 35 million yen. This was during the period of the Japanese visit by Grand Duke 
George Mikhailovich, which opened a way to the Russo-Japanese diplomatic negotiations. 
　The last wave in arms purchasing in Japan was the weakest one, and it was extended 
in time greatly from June 1916 until the October Revolution. The total sum of orders, 
placed through Taihei Kumiai in this period, was equal to 37.5 million yen. Russian 
purchasing in Japan was restricted mostly by the loan question, in which Japan did 
not wish to change its rigid position. At the same time, the Japanese Government 
strived to guarantee its rights on the southern part of the CER, but the arms question 
in Russia lost its importance and this bargain had no special attraction for the Russian 
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Government. Russia reasonably stressed that Japan as an ally should give Russia some 
significant military support, including loans, but Japan waited for the cession of the 
CER. As a result, negotiations about the loans and the CIR continued until the February 
Revolution, but did not succeed.74 Actually, it was a kind of stalemate in Russo-Japanese 
relations during the First World War, because both Japan and Russia had almost 
decided their problems and had to prepare for the new configuration of world politics 
after the Great War. By July 1916, Russia had almost coped with the lack of weapons, 
and ‘the Brusilov offensive’ of summer 1916 demonstrated it well. In other words, the 
zenith of the Russo-Japanese Rapprochement – the bilateral secret Alliance Treaty from 
July 3, 1916 – meant also that the active partnership of Russia and Japan in the Great 
War was over. As for the arms supply question in bilateral relations after the February 
Revolution, it was influenced greatly with the Russo-American Rapprochement and, as a 
consequence, some kind of estrangement between Russia and Japan. 
　It should be specially noted that the Japanese military support was actively made, 
when the Russian Army was in the most difficult situation, that is, in summer 1915. At 
the same time, Japan’s arms supplying activities coincided generally with the period of 
the active participation of Japan in the Great War. At the beginning of the War, Japan 
was quite weak among the world powers, which is why it was forced to balance itself 
between nations. Russia, Japan’s neighbour in the Far East, became for Japan one of 
its Allied countries, and Japan attempted to normalise relations with its former enemy 
and to improve its position in the world politics. Russia was also weak in the Far East, 
and that created some conditions for the Russo-Japanese rapprochement in the East. 
However, together with the strengthening of Japan in the world economy and politics, 
its arms supply efforts became less and less enthusiastic. Japan needed a Russia that 
could support it in Manchurian and Chinese affairs, but the Russian Government was not 
going to take active part in these ‘adventures’. 
　It goes without saying that Japanese companies, especially Taihei Kumiai, pursued 
clearly egoistic aims in their business. However, they were forced to act under the 
control of Japanese government, which to a significant degree deterred their selfish 
aspirations and excluded chances for unlimited speculation. The Japanese government 
was interested in Russia’s political support of its Far Eastern policies, and, at the same 
time, tried to turn Russian foreign policy from the Far East toward Europe. Obviously, 
the quick and full victory of the Russian army did not seem to be a merit in the eyes of 
74　AVPRI, f. 134, op. 473, d. 152, ll. 62-63. 
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Japanese politicians, who considered, probably, that the dispatch of Russian troops from 
the Far East, and the transmission of all Russian weapons from there to the Eastern 
Front, were useful for them. Despite the above-mentioned limitations, at the beginning of 
the ‘European War’, the Japanese government, under the pressure of the ‘military party’ 
and Japan’s financial circles, had chosen a tactical course of supporting Russia with 
arms and munitions. The Russian Government highly evaluated Japan’s military support 
and strived to expand the framework of ‘the Arms Alliance’ as much as possible. This 
cooperative attitude of Russia appeared clearly in the beginning of 1916, during the visit 
of Great Duke Georgii Mikhailovich to Japan, and in the bilateral diplomatic negotiations 
that paved a way to the secret Russo-Japanese alliance treaty of July 3, 1916. 
　Since the summer of 1916, Japan was involved actively in the economic struggle for 
the Russian market, but the rigid position of the Japanese government both in the loan 
question and the CIR question (that ignored completely the principle of the ‘mutual 
concessions’ in the bilateral relations) could not contribute to the development of ‘the 
Russo-Japanese understanding’. By that time, the arms supply for Russia transformed in 
a sort of inertial movement, which had to be stopped in the nearest future. The strategic 
needs of both countries – Japan and Russia – were near to the saturation point. At the 
same time, by the end of 1916, ‘the first seats in the Russian market-theatre had been 
already occupied’ by American and British businessmen.75 That is, in the economic 
struggle for the Russian market Japan was left behind by the Allies. That situation was 
a prologue to the Revolution and the Siberian Intervention, when Japan attempted to 
secure its political and economic rights in the Russian Far East with the use of military 
force. 
* * *
　Until recently in both Russia and Japan the period of the First World War seemed 
to have been a sort of ‘unknown history’. In the Soviet Union, the war was described 
as ‘imperialistic’ and was usually treated as a background for the Socialist Revolution. 
For decades the old imperial regime had been used as an object for ideological critic, 
and all subjects of its political, economic and social life had been pictured in the form of 
caricature. In this sense, the growing interest in the First World War and the last days 
of Imperial Russia that can be seen nowadays among Russian historians seems to be 
very promising. 
　In Japan the period of the first world conflict was interwoven into national history 
75　See: AVPRI, f. 134, op. 473, d. 152, l. 46; NGS, file 5.1.5.17-7, vol. 4, pp. 1779-1785. 
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as a part of ‘Taisho democracy’, described primarily in terms of socio-political history. 
However, international and military aspects of this epoch and the features of Japan’s 
imperial order have not been clarified adequately. Roughly speaking, this period in 
Japanese history has been pictured as a ‘brilliant transitive era’ between the ‘glorious’ 
Russo-Japanese war and the ‘vicious’ militarism of 1930s. In this sense, the analysis of 
bilateral military relations during the First World War could fill in some blank spots 
in world history (relating mostly to the background of the Russian Revolution, the rise 
of Japanese militarism and the mechanics of imperialism as itself) and deepens our 
understanding of the state system of both countries. 
　In the case of Russia, this investigation helps us, first of all, to clarify some peculiar 
features of the political system of the Empire and, especially, the place of the Emperor 
in this system. At the very least, the study shows that Russia as a monarchy had a 
special attitude to Imperial Japan, which was the last country, to which Romanovs’ ‘Court 
Diplomacy’ had been applied. Importantly, not only geopolitical, but also civilizational 
factors can be found in the process of Russo-Japanese rapprochement during the First 
World War.76 Second, the investigation indirectly proves the fact that the Russian 
imperial system as a whole successfully coped with a lack of arms and ammunitions 
during the war. More concretely, the study contributes to the more accurate evaluation 
of GAU’s activities abroad, and demonstrates a rather successful example of the 
organization of arms supplies in Japan. That is, criticism of the principal inefficiency of 
the Russian Imperial Government’s policies, which can be seen in some studies even in 
recent years, does not apply here.77 Third, the study demonstrates that Japan’s military 
support had a great importance for imperial Russia during the most critical period of the 
war. This aspect of bilateral relations has been traditionally underestimated in Soviet 
historiography.78 
　In the case of Japan, the history of its military cooperation with Russia during 
the First World War constitutes a splendid background for analysis of the Japanese 
political and economic system of that time. In the first place, it helps us to trace the 
76　See about it in: Baryshev, Nichiro dōmei no jidai, 1914-1917, Ch. 12. 
77　See for example: Dale C. Dielage, Russian Supply Efforts in America During the First World 
War (Jefferson, North Carolina, and London: MaFarland & Company, 2002). 
78　Grigortsevich, Dalnevostochnaia politika imperialisticheskikh derzhav, pp. 515-520; Tekut’eva E. 
T., “Russko-yaponskie otnosheniya v period Pervoi mirovoi voiny (1915-1916 gg.),” Uchenye zapiski 
Moskovskogo gosudarstvennogo pedagogicheskogo institute imeni V. I. Lenina, Vol. CIX, 1957, pp. 
134-135. 
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autonomous diplomacy of the ‘military party’ during ‘the European War’ and to make 
clear its connections with the interests of the syndicate Taihei Kumiai. In fact, it was 
Japan’s ‘military party’, who actively engaged in the supplying of Russia with arms 
and munitions from 1914 to 1917, and managed to launch talks about the conclusion 
of the new political convention. That is, the study demonstrates the principal truth of 
the thesis – often seen in Soviet historiography – that the Russo-Japanese Alliance of 
1916 was induced by the Japanese side.79 Actually, the Russian Government was rather 
reluctant to engage in direct diplomatic rapprochement with Japan, but the Emperor 
attempted to grasp this opportunity in order to extend arms supplies from Japan. At 
the same time, it should be noted that the alliance of 1916 was not ‘imposed’ by Japan on 
Russia by military pressure, but was skilfully promoted in the atmosphere of the ‘mutual 
rapprochement’. 
　In the second place, for Japan the arms supply business was very valuable both 
economically and politically. Thanks to the arms trade, the Japanese army obtained 
great sums of money, which were immediately used for its modernization. In addition, 
Japanese economic circles improved their financial situation, expanded greatly their 
industrial production and acquired new international markets. In this sense, there is a 
need to state that the theses that Japan’s policy of military support towards Imperial 
Russia was ‘erroneous’, and these arms supplies were ‘unprofitable’80 is doubtlessly 
wrong. Moreover, production of Russian-model weapons at Japanese state and private 
factories is supposed to have resulted in transfer of Russian military technologies and 
know-how to Japan. 
　As mentioned above, the problems of Russo-Japanese diplomatic rapprochement 
during the First World War and the role of the Elder Statesmen in this process were 
analysed in the studies of Matsumoto Tadao, Peter Berton, Yoshimura Michio and some 
other scholars. However, for different reasons, these historians could not investigate 
carefully the military aspect of bilateral relations. In this sense, the present investigation 
contributes to clarification and reexamination of some arguments of the above-mentioned 
79　See: Grigortsevich, Dalnevostochnaia politika imperialisticheskikh derzhav, pp. 520-526; Kutakov 
L. N., Portsmutskii mirnyi dogovor (Iz istorii otnoshenii Yaponii s Rossiei i SSSR. 1905–1945). 
Moscow, 1961, pp. 130-135. Compare with: Berton P. A., The Secret Russo-Japanese Alliance of 
1916, pp. 83-91.
80　See for example: Taketomi Tokitoshi, Ōkuma naikaku zaisei kaisōroku (Recollections about the 
Financial Policy of the Okuma Cabinet), pp. 36-50; Akutagawa Tetsushi, “Buki yushutsu no keifu,” 
June 1987, Vol. 23 (No. 1), pp. 44-48.
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studies. This episode of Russo-Japanese military cooperation may be treated as a 
miniature of international and internal imperial order of that time, which highlights the 
mechanics of world politics and international strategies of Russia and Japan. 
Keywords　 the First World War, Russo-Japanese relations, arms supply, GAU, genro, 
Taihei Kumiai, loan question, the Chinese Eastern Railway (CER)
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